1. What's the source of the circle graphic on the circle of probabilities diminishing as Theism get's more specific as a hypothesis?
2. So I think some of your considerations are interesting, but I'm curious how you feel about this maneuver when Atheists use it against Theists? So, for example, when engaging in debates on the problem of evil, some Atheists will posit what we can call "the maximal worst state of affairs" and query if such a state of affairs will at least lower the epistemic probability of Theism if it turns out to be true? I think such a maneuver can be effective in showing that many Theistic responses to the problem of evil (theodicies and skeptical Theism) are not actually sensitive to evidence and violate general principles of Bayesian reasoning that apologists prize so much in other apologetic contexts.
More often than not, I feel, the theistic argument from fine-tuning is used as the motte in a motte-and-bailey doctrine, where the bailey features a benevolent deity, immortal souls, cosmic purpose or some other desired situation, for which fine-tuning provides no more support than it does for us being the cosmic equivalent of lab rats, extras in a gladiator movie, sacrificial goats or completely inconsequential side-effects. Personally, I accept that the apparent fine-tuning gives a reason for not summarily dismissing the hypothesis that our universe was designed, but not that it makes any particular bailey-claim credible.
A related case involves panpsychists who also adopt the theistic argument from fine-tuning. If consciousness, as opposed to anything physical, is the fundamental reality, then, given the current state of panpsychic theory and knowledge, we are in a state of complete ignorance over any fundamental constants!
Imagine we were to see the phrase "NOT MADE BY GOD" written in the stars. What sorts of cosmic scenarios should we start taking seriously upon encountering this evidence?
Any potential explanation for such an observation would also be available as an explanation for seeing the phrase "MADE BY GOD." But it seems odd for theists to assume that "MADE BY GOD" would constitute "extremely strong" evidence for theism, when "NOT MADE BY GOD" would prompt us to consider exactly the same range of possible scenarios.
Yes, I thought the same thing: the problem is that there are two messages, there's the multi-lingual stellarscript and the message actually written. If they conflict you have to balance the evidence.
Anyway, couldn't it "just" be technically superior aliens?
In Leslie's original, the message was written at regular intervals in crystals of granite.
If the messages are written in the stars, aliens would certainly be a plausible explanation for either message, and an atheist would be more likely to think "aliens" than "God."
Some versions of the scenario propose that we could discover the message written in sub-sub-sub-subatomic particles (e.g. the electron has an internal structure, and close examination reveals that this structure "spells out" a theistic message). If the details of such a scenario could be filled in, that is indeed the sort of thing that would reveal an unexpected connection between the fundamental physics and life-as-we-know-it (e.g. a creator of the universe who has a particular interest in humans.)
But it isn't clear that the details *can* be filled in, and it seems to me that the dialectical burden here lies with the fine-tuning advocate who thinks fine-tuning skepticism overgeneralizes due to reliance on a flawed epistemology. If there really are such flaws, they are going to be subtle ones that can't be revealed just by vaguely gesturing towards a hypothetical scenario: the scenario needs to be described in sufficient detail before the skeptic can offer a meaningful response.
"message written in sub-sub-sub-subatomic particles": then the sceptic could decide we're living in a simulation (which is actually one version of "a creator of the universe who has a particular interest in humans").
It amused me when Bostrom proposed his simulation argument: "we're all living in a construst created by superior beings". All the religious folk basically said "it's nothing like that, we're living in a construct created by one superior being"
>The point is that if you grant this, and this, and this, and this then all of a sudden you have a plausible story on your hands, where that model of God just might do something like write out “Made by God” in the sky.
The weird thing about the writing in the clouds argument is that it can cut against the fine tuning argument. When theists make the comparison they expect us to say “yes of course the writing in the clouds is evidence for god” because apparently this is the kind of thing a god is likely to do. But the more probability we assign to god doing that ham fisted obvious stuff we don’t observe like writing in the clouds, the less probability we have remaining to assign to god doing the subtle stuff we do observe like fine tuning the constants. So the stronger the clouds would be (purely counterfactually) as evidence, the weaker the fine tuning stuff is as evidence. You could make that argument more precise, but that’s already way more thinking than most of these folks have given to the matter…
I think you are technically correct on all points, but I fear that you may have missed the point a little, perhaps.
I agree that TM should not convince us that God exists. But, at least for me, the question is whether it should cause us to increase our credence in God a bit. And I think it should. Along with any other hypothesis that could explain it.
I deploy TM myself, on occasion. And when I do, it's usually to address the argument that any configuration is as likely as any other, so why should we seek an explanation for this specific configuration just because it seems remarkable to us? As for spelling out "Made by God" in stars and planets, the stars and planets have to be arranged some way, so why not this way? Why invoke God or any explanation beyond chance?
What you've done in this article is to show why we shouldn't conclude theism from TM alone by proposing a load of other possible explanations. This is good. I note that chance wasn't among them, even better. So you're not committing the mistake that I would invoke TM to argue against.
When it comes to FT, then, the point is that we shouldn't just shrug when presented with the evidence. We should take it to be evidence of *something*, and look for explanations. Credence in any such explanation should be increased by evidence of fine-tuning, including theism. That doesn't mean it should convince us of theism, because this is only one of many explanations. I prefer multiverse.
It wouldn't for me in a Bayesian sense. I can see how it could if someone has different assignments. Though Im fine with that, as it undermines the "force" of these arguments because it admits how subjective they are...
If God wanted to write something in the sky to convince us of their existence, this would be a better way to do it: https://old.reddit.com/r/rational/comments/7obnf7/fw_admin_message_from_god/
Great post. Two questions:
1. What's the source of the circle graphic on the circle of probabilities diminishing as Theism get's more specific as a hypothesis?
2. So I think some of your considerations are interesting, but I'm curious how you feel about this maneuver when Atheists use it against Theists? So, for example, when engaging in debates on the problem of evil, some Atheists will posit what we can call "the maximal worst state of affairs" and query if such a state of affairs will at least lower the epistemic probability of Theism if it turns out to be true? I think such a maneuver can be effective in showing that many Theistic responses to the problem of evil (theodicies and skeptical Theism) are not actually sensitive to evidence and violate general principles of Bayesian reasoning that apologists prize so much in other apologetic contexts.
I would need to hear a deep resonant voice.
I'm with your aside on Bayes Theorem.
BT is incredibly useful when you have to combine real probabilities from experiment/survey.
But using it in philosophical hand-waving is pretentious, counter-productive and verges on Emperor's New Clothes.
1. it greatly reduces your potential audience in fora like this.
2. it obfuscates rather than informs: if you can't explain the arguments without you don't understand them yourself.
3. it's more easy to make mistakes.
4. It's very difficult to discuss cos you can't have LaTex in comments.
If you are going to use it, at least try putting in a few easy values and check it really does prove what you're trying to show.
More often than not, I feel, the theistic argument from fine-tuning is used as the motte in a motte-and-bailey doctrine, where the bailey features a benevolent deity, immortal souls, cosmic purpose or some other desired situation, for which fine-tuning provides no more support than it does for us being the cosmic equivalent of lab rats, extras in a gladiator movie, sacrificial goats or completely inconsequential side-effects. Personally, I accept that the apparent fine-tuning gives a reason for not summarily dismissing the hypothesis that our universe was designed, but not that it makes any particular bailey-claim credible.
A related case involves panpsychists who also adopt the theistic argument from fine-tuning. If consciousness, as opposed to anything physical, is the fundamental reality, then, given the current state of panpsychic theory and knowledge, we are in a state of complete ignorance over any fundamental constants!
Imagine we were to see the phrase "NOT MADE BY GOD" written in the stars. What sorts of cosmic scenarios should we start taking seriously upon encountering this evidence?
Any potential explanation for such an observation would also be available as an explanation for seeing the phrase "MADE BY GOD." But it seems odd for theists to assume that "MADE BY GOD" would constitute "extremely strong" evidence for theism, when "NOT MADE BY GOD" would prompt us to consider exactly the same range of possible scenarios.
A beneficent god with a wicked sense of humour?
Yes, I thought the same thing: the problem is that there are two messages, there's the multi-lingual stellarscript and the message actually written. If they conflict you have to balance the evidence.
Anyway, couldn't it "just" be technically superior aliens?
In Leslie's original, the message was written at regular intervals in crystals of granite.
If the messages are written in the stars, aliens would certainly be a plausible explanation for either message, and an atheist would be more likely to think "aliens" than "God."
Some versions of the scenario propose that we could discover the message written in sub-sub-sub-subatomic particles (e.g. the electron has an internal structure, and close examination reveals that this structure "spells out" a theistic message). If the details of such a scenario could be filled in, that is indeed the sort of thing that would reveal an unexpected connection between the fundamental physics and life-as-we-know-it (e.g. a creator of the universe who has a particular interest in humans.)
But it isn't clear that the details *can* be filled in, and it seems to me that the dialectical burden here lies with the fine-tuning advocate who thinks fine-tuning skepticism overgeneralizes due to reliance on a flawed epistemology. If there really are such flaws, they are going to be subtle ones that can't be revealed just by vaguely gesturing towards a hypothetical scenario: the scenario needs to be described in sufficient detail before the skeptic can offer a meaningful response.
"message written in sub-sub-sub-subatomic particles": then the sceptic could decide we're living in a simulation (which is actually one version of "a creator of the universe who has a particular interest in humans").
It amused me when Bostrom proposed his simulation argument: "we're all living in a construst created by superior beings". All the religious folk basically said "it's nothing like that, we're living in a construct created by one superior being"
>The point is that if you grant this, and this, and this, and this then all of a sudden you have a plausible story on your hands, where that model of God just might do something like write out “Made by God” in the sky.
Yes
You can write ‘~’ in LaTeX using \sim
very nice
The weird thing about the writing in the clouds argument is that it can cut against the fine tuning argument. When theists make the comparison they expect us to say “yes of course the writing in the clouds is evidence for god” because apparently this is the kind of thing a god is likely to do. But the more probability we assign to god doing that ham fisted obvious stuff we don’t observe like writing in the clouds, the less probability we have remaining to assign to god doing the subtle stuff we do observe like fine tuning the constants. So the stronger the clouds would be (purely counterfactually) as evidence, the weaker the fine tuning stuff is as evidence. You could make that argument more precise, but that’s already way more thinking than most of these folks have given to the matter…
\sim
Hmm, that was interesing read. I wonder what do you think about arguments for atheism such as the problem of evil or divine hiddenness?
I think you are technically correct on all points, but I fear that you may have missed the point a little, perhaps.
I agree that TM should not convince us that God exists. But, at least for me, the question is whether it should cause us to increase our credence in God a bit. And I think it should. Along with any other hypothesis that could explain it.
I deploy TM myself, on occasion. And when I do, it's usually to address the argument that any configuration is as likely as any other, so why should we seek an explanation for this specific configuration just because it seems remarkable to us? As for spelling out "Made by God" in stars and planets, the stars and planets have to be arranged some way, so why not this way? Why invoke God or any explanation beyond chance?
What you've done in this article is to show why we shouldn't conclude theism from TM alone by proposing a load of other possible explanations. This is good. I note that chance wasn't among them, even better. So you're not committing the mistake that I would invoke TM to argue against.
When it comes to FT, then, the point is that we shouldn't just shrug when presented with the evidence. We should take it to be evidence of *something*, and look for explanations. Credence in any such explanation should be increased by evidence of fine-tuning, including theism. That doesn't mean it should convince us of theism, because this is only one of many explanations. I prefer multiverse.
It wouldn't for me in a Bayesian sense. I can see how it could if someone has different assignments. Though Im fine with that, as it undermines the "force" of these arguments because it admits how subjective they are...