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Woarna's avatar

> Well, presumably given that someone is a naturalist, AND that they think there are truth-apt propositions, it’s not too far-fetched to form the belief that maybe they have some natural account of what truth-apt propositions are.

Such an obvious point, it surprises me how people miss it. I would probably consider myself a naturalist, and my view of propositions takes them to be these sorts of structured cognitive acts. We identify propositions with instances of agents mentally predicating and what have you. Now, you could dispute this account, but as it stands, from my point of view, it's a satisfactory account and is compatible with naturalism. So, why would I endorse P1 (or P3)? Well written article.

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Mon0's avatar

Great article

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