"Naturalists who believe that reality is exhausted by physical events have the following options available to them to reasonably reject this argument against naturalism. Suppose they accept P2, that If naturalism is true then reality is exhausted by physical “effects” [events]. They either believe (P3) in truth-apt propositions, in which case they understand truth-apt propositions to be natural things (i.e. being fully grounded in physical events like typing with your fingers in space-time causing electricity to go through wires and make markings that are language on a page etc.) and hence deny P1, that if something is a physical “effect” [event] then it is not a truth-apt proposition, so the argument is unsound. Or they do not believe (P3) in truth-apt propositions (because they understand such things to be non-natural spooks that have no place in their metaphysics), so the argument is unsound. And whichever way you cut it, the argument is just not going to work for naturalists."
I know you said you'd write more about this later, but I would love it if you have any particular resources or recommendations that touch upon these specific options in detail and what that kind of response could look like fully fleshed out.
> Well, presumably given that someone is a naturalist, AND that they think there are truth-apt propositions, it’s not too far-fetched to form the belief that maybe they have some natural account of what truth-apt propositions are.
Such an obvious point, it surprises me how people miss it. I would probably consider myself a naturalist, and my view of propositions takes them to be these sorts of structured cognitive acts. We identify propositions with instances of agents mentally predicating and what have you. Now, you could dispute this account, but as it stands, from my point of view, it's a satisfactory account and is compatible with naturalism. So, why would I endorse P1 (or P3)? Well written article.
Great article
Great post. A question this paragraph:
"Naturalists who believe that reality is exhausted by physical events have the following options available to them to reasonably reject this argument against naturalism. Suppose they accept P2, that If naturalism is true then reality is exhausted by physical “effects” [events]. They either believe (P3) in truth-apt propositions, in which case they understand truth-apt propositions to be natural things (i.e. being fully grounded in physical events like typing with your fingers in space-time causing electricity to go through wires and make markings that are language on a page etc.) and hence deny P1, that if something is a physical “effect” [event] then it is not a truth-apt proposition, so the argument is unsound. Or they do not believe (P3) in truth-apt propositions (because they understand such things to be non-natural spooks that have no place in their metaphysics), so the argument is unsound. And whichever way you cut it, the argument is just not going to work for naturalists."
I know you said you'd write more about this later, but I would love it if you have any particular resources or recommendations that touch upon these specific options in detail and what that kind of response could look like fully fleshed out.
Big topic -- this is an area I would love to do my PhD in.
Broadly two views I divide things into:
Representational Views:
- Ruth Milikan, Language a Biological Model
- Bryan Skyrms, Signals
- Lots of functionalist / Cog Sci Approaches in this area (can't say I've spent too much time on them)
- Hugging Faces NLP course ( https://huggingface.co/learn/nlp-course/chapter1/1 )
- Ferdinand Saussure, Course in General Linguistics
- Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics
- Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax
- Howard Lasnik and Jeffrey L. Lidz, The Oxford Handbook of Universal Grammar, The Argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus
Non-Representational Views:
- Chater & Christiansen, The Language Game
- Federenko et al, Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought
- Mark Wilson, Wandering Significance
- Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism
- Eric Schqitzgabel, Dispositionalism Yay! Representationalism Boo!
- Hasok Chang, Realism for Realistic People
P1: Physicalism is false.
P2: If physicalism is false nonphysicalism is true.
C: Nonphysicalism is true.
I can't believe those dumbfuck physicalists DIDN'T CONSIDER and have NO RESPONSE to this valid deductive argument 🤷♂️
> Well, presumably given that someone is a naturalist, AND that they think there are truth-apt propositions, it’s not too far-fetched to form the belief that maybe they have some natural account of what truth-apt propositions are.
Such an obvious point, it surprises me how people miss it. I would probably consider myself a naturalist, and my view of propositions takes them to be these sorts of structured cognitive acts. We identify propositions with instances of agents mentally predicating and what have you. Now, you could dispute this account, but as it stands, from my point of view, it's a satisfactory account and is compatible with naturalism. So, why would I endorse P1 (or P3)? Well written article.