“Whereof one cannot speak, one must be silent.” While it’s the ending aphorism from Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, it seems relevant here. While I applaud Nathan’s attempt at clarity here, I don’t know that it’s possible.
Funny to encounter this a day after finishing Laudan's Progress and Its Problems! I'll like it since Amos did. Doesn't seem very clear to me on either side so I won't try to get to the bottom of it.
I may well be missing something important here, but it seems to me that philosophical problems are by large contingent on language, i.e., they wouldn't arise for non-linguistic creatures (nor would many other problems besides, e.g., the problems which give rise to competing scientific theories).
So is what's at issue here, at least in part, whether a problem which can only arise for language-users (and often only given certain ways of using language) is best understood as a problem concerning language use, a problem which is best dealt with by just using language in a different way? Or whether at least some problems which can only arise for language-users can be best understood as not concerning language, or at least not concerning language alone?
An example (I think) of the latter: my wife and I recently had to replace our car, and we were weighing up what make to get, how much we were willing to pay for a longer warranty, etc. This seems to me to be a problem which could not arise outside of a quite specific linguistic context: but equally, it would seem odd to say that it is best understood as concerning language use, or that it would be best dealt with by using language differently.
“Solid attempt to get at the world, the problem itself, young man!”
Today I turned 21 and became a young man. For my birthday I want you to agree that there are seemingly incongruous facts about the world that words are about, but to which words are not identical.
You linked an article where you said “nah chief” to yourself for saying “OK, so we both agree that some linguistic evidence E exists, and we’re trying to provide some account of E.”
Of course, I disagree that the problem of material constitution is a problem of explaining linguistic data in the way that, say, the dispute between people who think >50% of moral utterances are truth-evaluable and people who deny or doubt this is. I think the problem is a problem about apparently incongruous facts about the world, which could be expressed in English or Yiddish or Swedish.
From the image you made me (thank you) it seems like you’re anticipating the objection that your attempt to render the problem of material constitution a pseudo-problem (‘you can’t have a problem if you don’t have words!’) seems sufficient to render many scientific problems — where there are seemingly incongruous empirical facts — pseudo-problems, even though the scientific community regards them as problems in good standing.
Judging from the graphic, your response to this is that scientific problems have solutions whereas philosophical problems don’t have solutions, as evidenced by the fact that people like Philip Goff who are working on the hard problem of consciousness have reached a stalemate. But even if the hard problem of consciousness were a pseudo-problem, that wouldn’t lend much credence to the claim that the problem of material constitution is a pseudo-problem, since they are different issues. I’m sure you agree that some ‘problems’ are problems and others are pseudo-problems; one ‘problem’ being a pseudo-problem doesn’t give you good evidence that an unrelated ‘problem’ is a pseudo-problem.
Of course, your claim will be that most if not all ‘problems’ in analytic philosophy are pseudo-problems. This might be so, but it looks like the only reason you’ve given me for thinking that the problem of material constitution is a psuedo-problem is appealing to a broader principle that philosophical problems are psuedo-problems. But I already knew that that was what you believed.
I am quite prone to suggestion, so incanting “Philosophy is fake! Philosophy is fake!” over and over will make me slightly more likely to agree with you. But I don’t think it would ultimately work and if it did it would be for the wrong reasons.
Philosophy is outgrown. It’s not fake. It’s something you jettison because philosophy is a type of therapy. You are a participant in life and the way you solve philosophical problems is to live it out, and use the insights you gain to put together your experience in really nice and cool ways. Do not attempt to construct mental artifacts like “concepts” to undergird your theories. They look like they do heavy lifting but they are an incomplete sensory model for the real thing, and clearly they have no true metaphysical underpinning. Theres no need for the grounding of objects in the world, but there is one for concepts. And what concepts are grounded in in the happenings of lived, embodied experience.
If conceptualism is true then physicalism is false. But obviously it's intuitive that only physical theories can account for concept use. So conceptualism is false and physicalism is still true.
Now, you see the conceptualist solution would imply that you can change the matter of shrimp in a way that the shrimp wouldn't survive but that concept of shrimp still would. But in that case, the matter of shrimp mattering would be composed of different mattering than the shrimp itself. You can literally observe the concept of shrimp mattering by opening your eyes and attending to the shrimpfulness of the experience. This is believed by at least one atheist professor. So we can see that conceptualism about shrimp mattering is really quite absurd.
Amos here identifies the key weakness in Nathan's argument: it overlooks the fact that Germanic languages allow speakers to directly represent metaphysical reality. In some other languages (e.g. French), this is not possible, which is why philosophy written in *those* languages is mostly concerned with meaningless pseudo-problems. But the historical influence of French on English is limited to vocabulary, and it does not threaten English's ability to act as a viable language for metaphysics (alongside Yiddish, Swedish, Gothic, Pennsylvania Dutch, Swiss German, etc.). Nathan's concerns here are misplaced.
Far off on the "different languages" (though I wouldn't say you made a clear point here -- perhaps you should have drawn a picture), "no language -> pseudo-problem", and "some philosophical problems are intractable -> they all are" counter-arguments.
(1) Is the problem not one of explaining what we are doing when we use modal adverbs?
I’d love to see a video of our pre-literate ancestors watching sand grains pile up. They’d be so spooked. Thank god they evolved language so we can give voice to this sense of bafflement.
Guess my joke didn’t land. I was thinking of Sorites cases. It’s sort of hilarious to imagine people being baffled by the phenomenon of sand grains accumulating into a pile, as if there was some metaphysically real and mysterious transformation taking place, absent the trappings of language.
Do the metaphysicians who take mereology seriously think that our ancestors would have been surprised to see sand accumulate into a pile, and language merely helps us give voice to this primal surprise? Or is language the source of the confusion? My moneys on the latter.
My current view is that "concept" is a ̶c̶o̶n̶c̶e̶p̶t̶-̶h̶o̶r̶s̶e̶ ̶ word. Open to revision. I don't give "concepts" as things any characterisation beyond the use of a word.
if someone had a plausible account of how relations are perceived without being conceptualized, this might be the basis for a nice, noncircular explanation of concepts
if someone had a plausible account of how the differences in experience and our act of making sense of them are perceived without being conceptualized, this might be the basis for a nice, noncircular explanation of concepts
No, edge detection might not be anything psychological at all. Assuming that it is, it’s a poor candidate for anything cognitive/conceptual. Core examples of cognitive states would include thinking that you’re probably still in New Jersey when you wake up in a pitch-black room tied to a chair, rememberng that you have a knife hidden in your left boot, and timing how long you have until the guard returns by measuring intervals by counting the dripping sounds coming from the faucet. Non-cognitive/non-conceptual states would include the burning sensation from the gun-shot wound nn the back of your leg, and noticing the smell of an unknown gas that is slowly filling the room. The main division is between sensory states (noncognitive) versus states of thinking and reasoning (cognitive). Mental imagery is a possible third category that is like an off-line reactivation of sensory states distinguishable from thoughts properly so-called because the latter have a representational format that is more language-like, whereas imagery and sensory representations have more of an iso-morphism-based, pictorial or analog representational format.
My bet is that every category of mental event that happens consciously also is capable of happening unconsciously. Further, the unconscious ones are the vast majority. I don’t have much use for a personal/subpersonal distinction. I also don’t think “reflexive” isn’t worth much beyond labeling a handful of widespread common reflexes like the gag reflex, the babinski reflex, the rooting reflex, the eye blink reflex, and a handful of others. Probably there is an interesting question of what can and what cannot, even with biofeedback training, be brought under voluntary control. Maybe we will one day toilet train all animals. That would be an achievement.
Hey it's Greg, not sure why YT is deleting your comments. My email is in my YT bio if you wanna connect that way. Also Danny has my contact info
“Whereof one cannot speak, one must be silent.” While it’s the ending aphorism from Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, it seems relevant here. While I applaud Nathan’s attempt at clarity here, I don’t know that it’s possible.
Funny to encounter this a day after finishing Laudan's Progress and Its Problems! I'll like it since Amos did. Doesn't seem very clear to me on either side so I won't try to get to the bottom of it.
I may well be missing something important here, but it seems to me that philosophical problems are by large contingent on language, i.e., they wouldn't arise for non-linguistic creatures (nor would many other problems besides, e.g., the problems which give rise to competing scientific theories).
So is what's at issue here, at least in part, whether a problem which can only arise for language-users (and often only given certain ways of using language) is best understood as a problem concerning language use, a problem which is best dealt with by just using language in a different way? Or whether at least some problems which can only arise for language-users can be best understood as not concerning language, or at least not concerning language alone?
An example (I think) of the latter: my wife and I recently had to replace our car, and we were weighing up what make to get, how much we were willing to pay for a longer warranty, etc. This seems to me to be a problem which could not arise outside of a quite specific linguistic context: but equally, it would seem odd to say that it is best understood as concerning language use, or that it would be best dealt with by using language differently.
“Solid attempt to get at the world, the problem itself, young man!”
Today I turned 21 and became a young man. For my birthday I want you to agree that there are seemingly incongruous facts about the world that words are about, but to which words are not identical.
You linked an article where you said “nah chief” to yourself for saying “OK, so we both agree that some linguistic evidence E exists, and we’re trying to provide some account of E.”
Of course, I disagree that the problem of material constitution is a problem of explaining linguistic data in the way that, say, the dispute between people who think >50% of moral utterances are truth-evaluable and people who deny or doubt this is. I think the problem is a problem about apparently incongruous facts about the world, which could be expressed in English or Yiddish or Swedish.
From the image you made me (thank you) it seems like you’re anticipating the objection that your attempt to render the problem of material constitution a pseudo-problem (‘you can’t have a problem if you don’t have words!’) seems sufficient to render many scientific problems — where there are seemingly incongruous empirical facts — pseudo-problems, even though the scientific community regards them as problems in good standing.
Judging from the graphic, your response to this is that scientific problems have solutions whereas philosophical problems don’t have solutions, as evidenced by the fact that people like Philip Goff who are working on the hard problem of consciousness have reached a stalemate. But even if the hard problem of consciousness were a pseudo-problem, that wouldn’t lend much credence to the claim that the problem of material constitution is a pseudo-problem, since they are different issues. I’m sure you agree that some ‘problems’ are problems and others are pseudo-problems; one ‘problem’ being a pseudo-problem doesn’t give you good evidence that an unrelated ‘problem’ is a pseudo-problem.
Of course, your claim will be that most if not all ‘problems’ in analytic philosophy are pseudo-problems. This might be so, but it looks like the only reason you’ve given me for thinking that the problem of material constitution is a psuedo-problem is appealing to a broader principle that philosophical problems are psuedo-problems. But I already knew that that was what you believed.
I am quite prone to suggestion, so incanting “Philosophy is fake! Philosophy is fake!” over and over will make me slightly more likely to agree with you. But I don’t think it would ultimately work and if it did it would be for the wrong reasons.
Philosophy is outgrown. It’s not fake. It’s something you jettison because philosophy is a type of therapy. You are a participant in life and the way you solve philosophical problems is to live it out, and use the insights you gain to put together your experience in really nice and cool ways. Do not attempt to construct mental artifacts like “concepts” to undergird your theories. They look like they do heavy lifting but they are an incomplete sensory model for the real thing, and clearly they have no true metaphysical underpinning. Theres no need for the grounding of objects in the world, but there is one for concepts. And what concepts are grounded in in the happenings of lived, embodied experience.
If conceptualism is true then physicalism is false. But obviously it's intuitive that only physical theories can account for concept use. So conceptualism is false and physicalism is still true.
What are Matthew Adelsteins intuitions on the matter?
Now, you see the conceptualist solution would imply that you can change the matter of shrimp in a way that the shrimp wouldn't survive but that concept of shrimp still would. But in that case, the matter of shrimp mattering would be composed of different mattering than the shrimp itself. You can literally observe the concept of shrimp mattering by opening your eyes and attending to the shrimpfulness of the experience. This is believed by at least one atheist professor. So we can see that conceptualism about shrimp mattering is really quite absurd.
>"English or Yiddish or Swedish"
Amos here identifies the key weakness in Nathan's argument: it overlooks the fact that Germanic languages allow speakers to directly represent metaphysical reality. In some other languages (e.g. French), this is not possible, which is why philosophy written in *those* languages is mostly concerned with meaningless pseudo-problems. But the historical influence of French on English is limited to vocabulary, and it does not threaten English's ability to act as a viable language for metaphysics (alongside Yiddish, Swedish, Gothic, Pennsylvania Dutch, Swiss German, etc.). Nathan's concerns here are misplaced.
Close!
Far off on the "different languages" (though I wouldn't say you made a clear point here -- perhaps you should have drawn a picture), "no language -> pseudo-problem", and "some philosophical problems are intractable -> they all are" counter-arguments.
(1) Is the problem not one of explaining what we are doing when we use modal adverbs?
I’d love to see a video of our pre-literate ancestors watching sand grains pile up. They’d be so spooked. Thank god they evolved language so we can give voice to this sense of bafflement.
I genuinely can't interpret what you mean by this
Guess my joke didn’t land. I was thinking of Sorites cases. It’s sort of hilarious to imagine people being baffled by the phenomenon of sand grains accumulating into a pile, as if there was some metaphysically real and mysterious transformation taking place, absent the trappings of language.
Do the metaphysicians who take mereology seriously think that our ancestors would have been surprised to see sand accumulate into a pile, and language merely helps us give voice to this primal surprise? Or is language the source of the confusion? My moneys on the latter.
I could see that as one interpretation, I wasn't sure of another interpretation that was like "obviously people had CONCEPTS"
the coolest thing about concepts is that they are just like words but also they are not words
My current view is that "concept" is a ̶c̶o̶n̶c̶e̶p̶t̶-̶h̶o̶r̶s̶e̶ ̶ word. Open to revision. I don't give "concepts" as things any characterisation beyond the use of a word.
concepts persist between occasions of use
Concepts are just a really nice word we use for perceived relations that we can articulate and use again and again
if someone had a plausible account of how relations are perceived without being conceptualized, this might be the basis for a nice, noncircular explanation of concepts
They are perceived as the differences in experience and our act of making sense of them
if someone had a plausible account of how the differences in experience and our act of making sense of them are perceived without being conceptualized, this might be the basis for a nice, noncircular explanation of concepts
This could mean a lot of things to me. Is there anything you would refer me to?
two articles at stanford encyclopedia of philosophy: the one on Concepts, and the one on Nonconceptual Mental Content
No, edge detection might not be anything psychological at all. Assuming that it is, it’s a poor candidate for anything cognitive/conceptual. Core examples of cognitive states would include thinking that you’re probably still in New Jersey when you wake up in a pitch-black room tied to a chair, rememberng that you have a knife hidden in your left boot, and timing how long you have until the guard returns by measuring intervals by counting the dripping sounds coming from the faucet. Non-cognitive/non-conceptual states would include the burning sensation from the gun-shot wound nn the back of your leg, and noticing the smell of an unknown gas that is slowly filling the room. The main division is between sensory states (noncognitive) versus states of thinking and reasoning (cognitive). Mental imagery is a possible third category that is like an off-line reactivation of sensory states distinguishable from thoughts properly so-called because the latter have a representational format that is more language-like, whereas imagery and sensory representations have more of an iso-morphism-based, pictorial or analog representational format.
My bet is that every category of mental event that happens consciously also is capable of happening unconsciously. Further, the unconscious ones are the vast majority. I don’t have much use for a personal/subpersonal distinction. I also don’t think “reflexive” isn’t worth much beyond labeling a handful of widespread common reflexes like the gag reflex, the babinski reflex, the rooting reflex, the eye blink reflex, and a handful of others. Probably there is an interesting question of what can and what cannot, even with biofeedback training, be brought under voluntary control. Maybe we will one day toilet train all animals. That would be an achievement.